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The Delaware Carve-Out's Carve:
Examining and Repairing SLUSA's State
Law Exception
Kenneth Hsu *
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 and
subsequent Great Depression, Congress responded by venturing into
territory previously regulated by the states: securities law.1
Concerned that state "blue sky" laws2 alone were inadequate to
police transactions involving nationally traded securities, Congress
enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") 3 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), 4 a massive body of legislation
that continues to anchor securities regulation today.' The acts
spawned decades of legislation intended to promote confidence in
national markets while encouraging the investment necessary to
stimulate the economy. 6 In doing so, Congress mandated a myriad of
securities-related disclosures from issuers and provided relief to
investors harmed by securities fraud, including the general antifraud
* J.D. Candidate, UC Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Politics, New York University.
Thank you to all of the editors of the Hastings Business Law Journalfor their hard work; to
Professor Reza Dibadj for suggesting the subject of this note; and to all of my family and friends
for inspiring me everyday.
1. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) ("In
response to the sudden and disastrous collapse in prices of listed stocks in 1929, and the Great
Depression that followed, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.").
2. Like their federal counterparts, state "blue sky" securities laws generally regulate the
offering and sale of securities to protect investors from fraud.
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2014).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2014).
5. See Dabit,547 U.S. at 78; Michael A. Perino, FraudandFederalism:PreemptingPrivate
State SecuritiesFraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 280-81 (1998).
6. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
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provision of Section 10(b), the eventual centerpiece of most federal
securities fraud litigation today.7 Especially after the advent of class
action lawsuits in federal civil procedure, these securities laws
empowered investors with causes of action to hold issuers
accountable for fraudulent practices.8
Sixty years later, Congress contemplated another advancement
into state law when it enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1996 ("SLUSA"). 9 This time, perhaps ironically,
Congress was intent on inhibiting the use of class actions to allege
securities fraud. Long past the panic of the 1930s, Congress was now
sympathetic to companies complaining about litigating baseless
"strike suits" and paying extortionate settlements to opportunistic
plaintiffs.10 Congress was alerted to the chilling effect such litigation
had on corporate disclosures, hindering the type of capital formation
securities law was intended to promote. To remedy these burdens,
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("the PSLRA")'
imposed heightened pleading standards and discovery restrictions,
13
among other new rules, on securities fraud class action plaintiffs.
After loopholes within the PSLRA were quickly exposed, Congress
went a step further by enacting SLUSA.1 4
SLUSA's most
important -and controversial -provisions precluded certain state law
securities-related claims from being brought as class actions
15
altogether.
Unsurprisingly, SLUSA's denial of the class action vehicle for
state law causes of action invited sensitive federalism questions.1 6 The

7. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976).
8. See Perino, supra note 5,at 283-84.
9. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
10. See Dabit,547 U.S. at 81. See alsoPerino,supra note 5,at 290-92 (1998).
11. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998).
12. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
14. See Dabit,547 U.S. at 82.
15. See discussion infra Part I.B.
16. See Jennifer O'Hare, DirectorCommunications and the Uneasy RelationshipBetween
the FiduciaryDut ofDisclosure and the Anti-FraudProvisions of the FederalSecurities Lairs,
70 U. CIN. L. REv. 475, 477 (20(P) ("[SLUSA] would also prohibit the states from regulating
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transactions and events being litigated by these precluded actions
typically involved conduct also regulated by corporate law, a realm
traditionally reserved to the states-most notably, Delaware.17
Would SLUSA preclude some state corporate law claims altogether
as well'? If so, did SLUSA signify an erosion of state control of
corporate regulation'?
Mindful of these issues, Congress decided not to break new
ground. Instead, it included within SLUSA a clause that became
popularly known as the "Delaware carve-out."' 8 In short, the carveout is a carefully written savings clause that preserves state law claims
that would otherwise be dismissible under SLUSA preclusion. 9 In
spite of the obvious regulatory overlap between federal securities law
and state corporate law, federal lawmakers delicately avoided
interfering with the latter since the Depression. 0 The carve-out was
designed to continue this trend.
Legislative history surrounding the carve-out suggests that
Congress was particularly concerned about the overlap between the
causes of action for securities fraud under federal law and for breach
of the fiduciary duty to disclose under state common law. 2' To ensure
that SLUSA would not preclude an important state law cause of
action, Congress codified the then-existing fiduciary duty to disclose
under Delaware law and "carved out" any such claims from SLUSA
preclusion. 2" The carve-out therefore symbolizes a small portion of
the long respected border between federal securities law and state
corporate law. 3 In practical terms, the carve-out is an invaluable
opportunity for class action plaintiffs to litigate claims that would

certain behavior of directors, creating a significant federalism issue."); Richard W. Painter,
Responding to a False Alarm: FederalPreemption of State SecuritiesFraudCauses of Action,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 65-71 (1998) (explaining "dual-forum class action framework" between
federal securities law and state corporate law).
17. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998).
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1998).
20. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 501 ("Just as Delaware courts have sought to respect the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, Congress has attempted to respect state
corporate law.").
21. Id. at 502-03.
22. Id. at 504.
23. Id. at 501.
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otherwise be dismissed by SLUSA. For defendants, the carve-out is a
dangerous hole in the PSLRA and SLUSA's shield from such
litigation.
The carve-out's broad statutory language, however, does not
provide much clarity for parties litigating its applicability. While
three circuit level opinions have addressed particular portions of the
carve-out's text, none have offered a controlling understanding of the
statute.2)4 The carve-out's precise scope instead remains largely
defined by an assortment of lower court decisions relying on different
interpretations of the statutory language and of related case law. -'
Amid such uncertainty, this note seeks to discern some clarity to the
carve-out's reach and evaluate its effectiveness.
Part II of this note details the evolution of federal securities
regulation since the Depression, highlighting Congress's expansion
and eventual reining in of private securities fraud class action
litigation. These trends not only provide the backdrop to the note's
findings, but also shed light on Congress's reasons for enacting
SLUSA.
Part III investigates how lower courts have interpreted the carveout since its passage. This analysis is informed by an extensive survey
of case law construing the carve-out's text. By dividing the carve-out
into four core prongs, this note illustrates how certain portions of its
statutory language have determined its influence on securities class
action litigation after SLUSA.
Finally, Part IV argues that courts interpreting the carve-out
should be more cautious of preempting state law causes of action.
The note explains how the carve-out quickly became outdated and
suggests that the federal courts compensate by deferring more to their
state counterparts. This assertion is also informed by recent federal
case law addressing the carve-out's reach and, more broadly, the
limits on securities class actions under SLUSA.

24. See Campbell v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 760 F.3d 62 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Atkinson v. Morgan
Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2011); Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.
2009).
25. See cases cited infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND: SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION BEFORE THE CARVE-OUT
A. SECTION 10(B)/RULE 1OB-5
Congress has historically responded to market abuses and
failures by increasingly regulating the sales of securities. Prior to
1933, states equipped with "blue sky" laws were the sole regulators of
securities transactions)26
However, without jurisdiction over
transactions that occurred past state lines, these statutes were
generally perceived as ineffective in protecting investors from
widespread securities fraud)27 In the wake of the Great Depression,
Congress filled the regulatory vacuum by enacting both the 1933 Act
and 1934 Act "to heighten fiduciary obligations in securities
transactions in order to restore public confidence in the nation's
financial market.'" 8 Arguably the most important provision from
these two acts, Section 10(b) ("§ 10(b)") of the 1934 Act empowered
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to promulgate
anti-fraud rules preventing the use of fraudulent or deceptive devices
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."2 9 The SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5 ("10b-5"), the "catchall" antifraud provision
used to police most securities fraud today.
In recent decades, Congress and the federal courts have reined in
private rights of action under § 10(b) and 10b-5. 30 Notably, in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court foreshadowed
26. See Painter,supra note 16, at 21 (describing the history of state "blue sky" laws).
27. Id. at 22-23.
28. Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Lftisation: Dealing
ifith the Mteritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1066-67 (1999)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1 (1933)). See alsoPainter,supra note 16, at 23-25.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2014).
30. See Ramirez, supra note 28, at 1071-72 ("Although the Court has continued to interpret
the federal securities laws broadly in areas dominated by public enforcement action, it recently
has expressed little support for private enforcement of the federal securities laws."); Joshua D.
Ratner, Stockholders' Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035, 1045 (2001) ("In recent decades, the federal
judiciary has taken a more negative view of private securities suits ...").
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Congressional concern when it warned about the dangers of allowing
unlimited § 10(b) and 10b-5 standing for class actions, namely the
"widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a
danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that
which accompanies litigation in general." 31 The Court recognized a
need to protect companies against floods of meritless "strike suits"
brought merely to obtain a settlement. 32 By the 1990s, these same
policy considerations persuaded Congress to step in and effectively
alter the rule governing class actions alleging securities fraud.
B.

THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF

1995

Congress echoed the Supreme Court's policy concerns in Blue
Chip Stamps when it passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") 33 to protect companies against meritless class
action litigation. 34 The PSLRA's legislative history identifies three
problems that the act was intended to remedy. First, it was too easy
for "professional plaintiffs" to craft securities fraud claims in federal
court, even if their claims were frivolous or baseless. 3 As a Senate
Banking Committee report noted, "[a] drop in a public company's
stock price, a failed product development project, or even
unpredictable adverse market conditions that affect earnings results
for a quarter can trigger numerous securities fraud lawsuits against a
company. ,36 Secondly, even if a lawsuit's claims were deficient, the
costs of litigating against a securities-related class action -particularly
in discovery-often coerced companies into large settlements well
before a court would consider the claims' merits. 3' Finally, the mere
31. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
32. Id. at 740.
33. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
34. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.
2003) (describing the PSLRA as "a demonstrably unavailing attempt by Congress . . . to
'prevent strike suits,' described as 'meritless class actions that allege fraud in the sale of
securities."') (citations omitted).
35. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1998). For a detailed explanation of the Congressional
debate surrounding the passage of the PSLRA, see Perino, supra note 5,at 290-91.
36. S.REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1998).
37. See id. at 9 ("Of the approximately 300 securities lawsuits filed each year, almost 93
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threat of class action litigation chilled companies from disclosing
forward-looking information that could potentially be construed as
inaccurate.38 Congress found such disclosure to be crucial for
everyday investment decisions and, more generally, for large-scale
capital formation.3 9
To remedy these problems, the PSLRA established numerous
procedural hurdles for securities fraud class actions plaintiffs. These
new requirements included the following: (i) heightened pleading
requirements,40 (ii) a mandatory stay of discovery pending motions to
dismiss, 41 and (iii) safe harbor provisions for "forward-looking"
statements.' The PSLRA thus added a subset of rules to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that applied solely to private securities fraud
class action litigants.43
1.

The PSLRA :s "FederalFghtLoophole"

While the PSLRA's new requirements were sweeping, the
number of securities fraud class actions in the wake of the PSLRA did
not decline as expected.44 Congress found an obvious explanation
within the PSLRA itself, namely, that it applied to litigants in the
federal forum only. 4 By solely targeting plaintiffs in federal court,
the PSLRA inadvertently created incentives to sue in state court.4 6
Crafty plaintiffs' attorneys circumvented the PSLRA's requirements
by simply filing actions under state law causes of action (e.g., common
settle at an average settlement cost of $8.6 million. These cases are generally settled based not
on the merits but on the size of the defendant's pocketbook.").
38. See Perino, supra note 5, at 292.
39. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2014).
41. Id. at § 78u-4(b)(3).
42. Id. at § 77z-2.
43. See Perino, supra note 5, at 292 ('IT]he [PSLRA] creates a separate subset of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that applies only to securities fraud cases."); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, IWhY the FatLady
Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 995-96 (1996) (discussing the PSLRA's impact on
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
44. See Perino, supra note 5, at 299-300 (examining three different studies that surveyed
post-PSLRA litigation data).
45. Dabit,547 U.S. at 82.
46. See Perino, supra note 5, at 292-93.
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law fraud), often in state court, if the facts would not survive the
PSLRA's more stringent requirements.4 7 In other instances, plaintiffs
would bring parallel federal and state law claims, enabling them to
avoid the PSLRA's defendant friendly discovery provisions while
taking advantage of more liberal state discovery rules. 48 These
strategies produced an increase of class action litigation involving
nationally traded securities in state court, which was rare prior to the
PSLRA's passage.49
Congress quickly became concerned that the "federal flight
loophole" was frustrating the PSLRA's initial objectives. 0 The prePSLRA threat of litigating "strike suits" may have been phased out,
but it was quickly replaced by the risk of litigation in state court. s
This time, however, potential litigation exposed issuers to unfamiliar
federalism issues that securities law had struggled with for decades.
Issuers of nationally traded securities potentially faced liability in
multiple states, each with differing laws and procedures>s' In one
Congressional testimony, a state securities regulator remarked that,
under the then-existing regulatory scheme, "a single state can impose
the risks and costs of its peculiar litigation system on all national
issuers. "S3 With compelling evidence, Congress was once again
concerned about the impact class action litigation-now in state

47. Id. ("Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the Reform Act, plaintiffs and
their representatives began bringing class actions under state law, often in state court.").
48. S. REP. No.105-182, at 3 (1995).
49. Dabit,547 U.S. at 82. ("The evidence presented to Congress... to evaluate the effects
of the Reform Act suggested that this phenomenon was a novel one; state-court litigation of
class actions involving nationally traded securities had previously been rare."); H.R. REP. No.
105-803, at 14 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) ("Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, there was
essentially no significant securities class action litigation brought in State court."). See also
Perino, supra note 5, at 298-301 (detailing empirical evidence suggesting an increase in the
number of class actions filed solely in state court in years after PSLRA's passage). California
was an especially crucial and popular state for post-PSLRA securities fraud litigation. For a
retrospective discussion of the post-PSLRA trends in California securities litigation and
legislation, see Painter, supra note 16, at 36-42.
50. Spielman,, 332 F.3d at 123.
51. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3-4 (1995) ("[S]tate-court class actions involving nationally
traded securities were virtually unknown prior to the [1995 Act]; they are brought with some
frequency now.").
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.at 5.
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court -had on the country's capital markets.5 4

C. TuE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF
1998
1.

SL I SA Removal andPreclusionProvisions

To curtail the migration to state court, Congress plugged the
PSLRA's "federal flight loophole" by enacting the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA")." Simply put,
SLUSA required that certain state law class action claims involving
nationally traded securities be brought under federal law to face the
stringent pleading and procedural standards of the PSLRA. To do so,
the PSLRA made "some state law claims nonactionable through the
56
class action device in both federal and state court.
SLUSA consists of two central provisions: a preclusion
provisions' and a removal provision. s
The preclusion provision
broadly bars any "covered class action ' s9 based upon state law if the
suit alleges fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security., 60 The term "covered security" includes securities

54. Id. at 4. ("This trend has created a ripple-effect that has inhibited small, high-growth
companies in their efforts to raise capital, and has damaged the overall efficiency of our capital
markets.").
55. See Dabit,547 U.S. at 82 ("To stem this 'shif[t] from Federal to State court' and
'prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to
frustrate the objectives of' the Reform Act, Congress enacted SLUSA.") (Internal full feature
citations omitted). For a detailed account of the legislative history and intense debate
surrounding SLUSA's preclusion provision, see Painter, supra note 16, at 41-60.
56. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 636 n.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2014). See also Kircher, 547 U.S. at 636 n.1 ("The preclusion
provision is often called a preemption provision; [SLUSA], however, does not itself displace
state law with federal law....
58. Id. § 77p(c).
59. For purposes of preclusion, SLUSA defines "covered class action" to mean any lawsuit
in which damages are sought on behalf of more than fifty people. See id. § 77p(f)(2)(A).
60. Id. § 77p(b). The fraud alleged must be either "an untrue statement or omission of a
material fact" or "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."
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traded on a national exchange. 61 Neither a federal nor state court has
jurisdiction over an action if it is precluded by SLUSA. To effectuate the preclusion provision, SLUSA's removal
provision allows state court defendants to remove "covered class
actions" to federal district court, where a judge determines (i) if the
suit may validly be maintained in federal court pursuant to the
removal clause, and (ii) if the suit is dismissible under SLUSA's
preclusion clause or otherwise falls within an exemption to removal,
such as the Delaware carve-out.

2.

63

SLIUSA s Preemption of State Law

Taken together, SLUSA's preclusion and removal provisions
prophylactically remedy the PSLRA's shortcomings.
SLUSA's
immediate goal was to halt the end run around the PSLRA by
precluding securities fraud class action litigation based upon state law
altogether.64 Congress thus deliberately decided that securities fraud
liability would be governed by uniform national standards. 6 By
sanctioning removal to federal court, where a federal judge
determines if an action is precluded, SLUSA gives federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction for virtually all class action litigation involving
nationally traded securities.6 6 If SLUSA preclusion applies, state law

61. Id. § 77p(f)(3).
62. See Kircher,547 U.S. at 644.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77bb(2)-(3). Notably, the removal provision only grants a district court
removal jurisdiction in cases that are precluded under SLUSA's preclusion provision. Thus, the
removal question necessarily depends on the preclusion question. See Kircher,547 U.S. at 64344. ("If the action is not precluded, the federal court likewise has no jurisdiction to touch the
case on the merits, and the proper course is to remand to the state court that can deal with it.").
64. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82. For an extensive exploration of the reach of SLUSA
preclusion, see Cecilia A. Glass, Note, Sword or Shield? SettinQgLimits on Slusa 's Ever-Groning
Reach, 63 DuKE L.J. 1337 (2014).
65. See H.R.REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
66. See id. ("[SLUSA] makes Federal court the exclusive venue for most securities class
action lawsuits"); see also Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d
Cir. 2001) (-SLUSA was passed in 1998 primarily to close this loophole in PSLRA. It did this by
making federal court the exclusive venue for class actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain
covered securities and by mandating that such class actions be governed exclusively by federal
law.")
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is entirely displaced.6 7 Class action plaintiffs lose the right to litigate
state law claims in both state and federal court. 68 Even if plaintiffs
choose to avoid SLUSA entirely and file a claim based upon federal
law, the action will likely be dismissed under the PSLRA's stringent
procedural requirements.
Nevertheless, Congress was aware that it was walking on thin ice.
Congressional reports highlighted that SLUSA's preemption of state
law invited sensitive federalism issues during a period in which
federal courts were known to reinforce state rights.69 The language
comprising SLUSA's preclusion provision -precluding allegations of
fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction-was broad
enough to bar certain state law claims from ever being heard in a class
action lawsuit again. Despite SLUSA's antifederalism undertones,
Congress found "the interest in promoting efficient national markets
to be the more convincing and compelling consideration. 7
a. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith Inc. v. Dabit
Courts deciding SLUSA's applicability have regularly deferred
to Congress's interest in curbing the abuses of class action securities
litigation. Most notably, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. v. Dabit, the U.S. Supreme Court relied primarily on policy
concerns when it defined SLUSA's preclusion provision broadly. The
Court held that SLUSA precluded even state law claims brought by
securities holders-those who neither purchased nor sold securities
during the alleged fraud-even though SLUSA expressly precludes
only state law claims made "in connection with the purchase orsale of
a covered security."'" Importantly, this same "in connection with"
and "purchase or sale" language appears in § 10(b)/10b-5 and has

67. Jennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the SecuritiesLitigation Unitorm StandardsAct: If
It Looks Like a SecuritiesFraud Claim and Acts Like a SecuritiesFraudClaim, Is It a Securities
FraudClaim ,56 ALA. L. REV. 325,338 (2004).
68. Id.
69. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) ("Some critics of establishing a uniform standard of
liability have attacked such legislation as being an affront on Federalism and contrary to the
recent trend towards reinforcing state rights.").
70. Id.
71. Dabit,547 U.S. at 89.
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been interpreted to exclude securities holders from the § 10(b)/10b-5
remedy. As such, holders of nationally traded securities have no
cause of action for securities-related fraud whatsoever.
Nevertheless, the Court deferred to Congress's statutory
construction and legislative intent, even after acknowledging its
presumption that Congress does not "cavalierly" preempt state law.7 "A narrow reading of the statute would undercut the effectiveness of
the [PSLRA] and thus run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose, viz.,
'to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits
alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives' of the
[PSLRA]. 73
After Dabit imposed a presumption of a broad
construction of SLUSA's preclusion provision, practitioners and
academics alike were unsure of exactly how far SLUSA reached into
state law remedies.74 As discussed below, the Court ultimately
recognized limitations to SLUSA's preemptive scope.
3.

SL I SA "sExceptions

Dabit also recognized the existence of several "tailored
exceptions to SLUSA's pre-emptive command" as evidence in favor
of a broad interpretation of SLUSA's preclusion provision.75 These
exceptions suggested that Congress offered at least some
consideration of state control before preempting state law.76 For
example, SLUSA exempts from preclusion actions brought by state
actors,7 7 actions under contractual agreements between issuers and
indenture trustees, 78 and exclusively derivative actions brought by a
corporation's shareholders.79
As a threshold matter, SLUSA precludes only those lawsuits that

72. Id. at 85-88.
73. Dabit,547 U.S. at 89.
74. Melanie P. Goolsby, Mlerrill Linch v. Dabit: The Case of the Scorned Broker and the
Death of the State Securities FraudClass Action Suit, 67 LA. L. REV. 227, 253 (2006).
75. Dabit,547 U.S. at 87.
76. Id. ("The existence of these carve-outs both evinces congressional sensitivity to state
prerogatives in this field.").
77. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2) (2014).
78. Id. § 77p(d)(3).
79. Id. § 77p(f)(2)(B).
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qualify as "covered class actions" against issuers of "covered
securities," which generally consist of nationally traded securities. 80
As such, smaller classes alleging claims involving securities traded on
smaller and more localized capital markets will likely survive
SLUSA. 8
Arguably the most important exception to SLUSA
preclusion, however, was a savings clause that preserved certain
claims based upon the law of the issuer's state of incorporation: the
Delaware carve-out.

III. THE DELAWARE CARVE-OUT
A. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DISCLOSURE UNDER DELAWARE LAW
AT TILE TIME OF SLUSA

The Delaware carve-out serves as a demarcation line in the
inherent overlap between post-SLUSA securities law and state
corporate law. At the time of SLUSA's passage, Delaware fiduciary
duty law required corporations or controlling shareholders to disclose
all material information within their control when requesting
shareholder action.8 For instance, early case law on the so-called
"duty of disclosure" found corporate boards and control persons to
be liable for inadequate disclosures in tender offers to minority
shareholders,' misleading proxy solicitations,' and false financial
statementsF
The similarities between 10(b)/10b-5 under the 1934 Act and the
duty of disclosure under Delaware law was the impetus behind the
carve-out. Like securities law, corporate law also holds companies
and their agents liable for making material misrepresentations or
80. Id. § 77p(b).
81. See O'Hare,supra note 67, at 339-40.
82. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Alob: The CorporateDirectors
FiduciaryDisclosureDun; 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1089-91 (1996); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d
75, 84 (Del. 1992) (describing the duty of disclosure as the "well-recognized proposition that
directors of Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all
material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action.").
83. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977).
84. In re Anderson Clayton Shareholders Litig., 519 A.2d 680, 690 (Del. Ch. 1986).
85. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,13 (Del. 1998).
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omissions.8 6 Although corporate law traditionally regulates corporate
internal affairs while securities law regulates open market disclosures,
the same facts that give rise to a securities fraud claim could also give
rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 87
Recognizing this commonality, Delaware courts for decades
minimized potential conflicts between the causes of action for
securities fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.88 For instance,
Delaware cases often crafted the duty of candor to only require
disclosures that were already mandated under federal law.8 9
Delaware courts also limited the duty of candor's general
applicability, consistently finding that the duty only applied when a
director or officer requested shareholder action. 90 As discussed later,
however, the Delaware Supreme Court disrupted these trends with a
surprising decision in 1998.
B.

THE PURPOSE OF TIE CARVE-OUT

Congress also was swayed to adopt a similar deferential
approach and preserve the bifurcation of corporate and securities
regulation. There were several benefits to reserving corporate lawespecially the fiduciary duty of candor-to the states. 91 First,
plaintiffs were accustomed to bringing lawsuits against directors and
officers under state law. Bringing claims for breach of the fiduciary
duty of candor were generally more attractive for plaintiffs as

86. See O'Hare,supra note 16, at 494.
87. Id.("For example, assume that a company is making a self-tender for its outstanding
common stock. After the tender offer has been completed, it is discovered that the company's
tender offer materials contained material misstatements or omissions. Because the company's
communications were materially false, a shareholder could bring an action for breach of
fiduciary duty of disclosure. In addition, because the misleading tender offer materials
constituted a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase and sale of a security,
the shareholder could also potentially bring an action under Rule IOb-5 of the federal securities
laws.").
88. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 495-501 (listing and analyzing numerous attempts by the
Delaware courts to respect the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities law).
89. See Hamermesh, supra note 82, at 1129-30.
90. Id.at 1130.
91. See Painter,supra note 16, at 65-67.
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compared to 10(b)/10b-5 claims. 92 To recover, plaintiffs only needed
to show that a corporate actor made a material misrepresentation or
omission.'
Plaintiffs did not need to establish reliance, causation,
scienter, or proof of actual damages, as is required in a standard
10(b)/10b-5 securities fraud claim. 94 Secondly, Congress heard
extensive testimony attesting to the compelling interests state
governments had in regulating corporations incorporated under their
laws.95 State courts provided judicial expertise and bodies of well
developed case law, allowing for quick resolution of corporate
disputes. 96 Because of these longstanding advantages, corporate
stakeholders relied on state law not only to resolve disputes of
corporate governance and fiduciary duties, but also to guide their
everyday business decisions. 97
In light of such evidence, Congress was concerned that the
advantages of state control of corporate regulation would be lost
under SLUSA preclusion. 9 Many class actions for breach of the duty
of disclosure would indeed qualify as "covered class actions" alleging
fraud "in connection with" a covered securities transaction, which
were barred under SLUSA.99 Moreover, preempting the duty of
disclosure could spawn widespread uncertainty as federal courts
would effectively become the sole regulators of corporate disclosures
to shareholders, a role long reserved by the state courts.to
By
adopting a fiduciary duty exception to SLUSA preclusion, Congress
deliberately avoided such an egregious effect.0 1 A Senate committee
92. See O'Hare,supra note 16, at 493.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 501-02.
96. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 502.
97. Id.
98. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998).
99. See O'Hara, supra note 16, at 501-04.
100. Id. at 5(P2.
101. Id. at 501-04 (quoting attorney John F. Olson's testimony to Congress, [N]arrow
tailoring of the carve-out provision matches the approach of the Delaware courts, which have
refused to extend the fiduciary duty of disclosure of material information relating to an action
requiring shareholder approval into a more general duty to the marketplace at large akin to that
imposed by the Federal securities law decisions."). See also Dabit,547 U.S. at 87-88 ("The
existence of these carve-outs both evinces congressional sensitivity to state prerogatives in this
field and makes it inappropriate for courts to create additional, implied exceptions.").
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report described Congress's intent behind the carve-out:
The Committee is keenly aware of the importance of state
corporate law, specifically those states that have laws that establish
a fiduciary duty of disclosure. It is not the intent of the Committee
in adopting this legislation to interfere with state law regarding the
duties and performance of an issuer's directors or officers in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an
affiliate from current shareholders or communicating with existing
shareholders with respect to voting their shares, acting in response
to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters' or appraisal
rights. 0'
To ensure litigation revolving around these types of conduct was
not precluded by SLUSA, Congress looked to the one resource that
could make the carve-out most effective: Delaware common law.
C.

THE TEXT OF THE CARVE-OUT

To carve out the fiduciary duty of candor from SLUSA
preclusion, Congress first codified the fiduciary duty of disclosure as
it existed under the Delaware law. 10 3 The text of the carve-out, titled
"Preservation of certain actions," was modeled on then-existing
Delaware common law.10 4 Under the carve-out, a class action based
upon the law of the state in which the issuer is incorporated or
organized may be maintained in a state or federal court05 if it
"involves" either:
(I) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate
of the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the
issuer; or
(II) any recommendation, position, or other communication with

102. S. REP. No. 105-182_, at 6(1998).
103. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 503.
104. Id.
105. According to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, although the carve-out states
that preserved actions "may be maintained in . . . federal court," it does not independently
create federal jurisdiction over any state-law class actions." Campbell, 760 F.3d at 64. Per
Kircher, district courts only have removal jurisdiction over claims under SLUSA's preclusive
scope and must remand claims preserved under the carve-out to state court. Id.
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respect to the sale of securities of the issuer that(aa) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the
issuer to holders of equity securities of the issuer; and
(bb) concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to
voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange
offer, or exercising dissenters' or appraisal rights."6
Importantly, both prongs of the carve-out (subsections (I) and
(II)) require some type of transaction or communication between a
corporate actor and a shareholder, as required for the fiduciary duty
of candor to attach under Delaware law at the time.10 7 As Professor
Jennifer O'Hare clarified, the first prong effectively preserves class
action claims brought by shareholders alleging that the defendant
company was fraudulent in connection with a buy-back transaction. 08
The second prong preserves class action claims brought by
shareholders alleging that the defendant company was fraudulent in
connection with a tender offer, exchange offer, or merger. 0 9
Delaware courts had applied the duty of candor to these types of
transactions for decades.1
Like many of the securities statutes that preceded it, the carveout was and remains tormented by broad language that leaves room
for divergent judicial interpretations. Nevertheless, the carve-out
immediately altered how SLUSA would be litigated, particularly in
state court. For example, a defendant facing securities fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty claims under state law in state court could
remove the action to federal court pursuant to SLUSA's removal
provision. If the court determines that the action is covered by
SLUSA's preclusion provision, the action will likely be dismissed. If
the court determines that the action is preserved under the carve-out,
1
the action will likely be remanded back to state court."

106. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(d)(1)(B) (1998). Subsections (I) and (II) have also been referred to
as the first and second Delaware carve-outs, respectively.
107. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 503 ("In other words, the Delaware carve-out requires a
request for shareholder action to maintain a class action in state court.").
108. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 503.
109. Id.
110. See cases cited supra notes 93-95.
111. Generally, SLUSA does not require the dismissal of non-precluded claims along with
precluded claims. See Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir.
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IV. DEFINING THE CARVE-OUT
The precise scope of the carve-out has been and continues to be
refined by federal courts since SLUSA's passage in 1998. Although
the carve-out was intended to serve as a tailored exception to SLUSA
preclusion, its statutory language contains broad terms ripe for
interpretation, both in favor of and against class action plaintiffs.
Most adjudication interpreting the carve-out has occurred after the
defendant removes the action from state court to federal district court
pursuant to SLUSA's removal clause. At this point, plaintiffs may
move for remand and contend that their action is preserved by the
carve-out, thereby removing the district court's jurisdiction.
The carve-out has only been meaningfully interpreted at the
circuit level in two instances: by the Ninth Circuit in Madden v.
Gowen & Go.112 and by the Sixth Circuit in Atkinson v. MorganAsset
Management, Inc.11 3 While the Supreme Court adjudicated on the
reach of SLUSA's preclusion provision in Dabit, the Court only
briefly mentioned the carve-out as evidence indicating "congressional
sensitivity" to preempting state-law causes of action. 1 4
This article divides the carve-out into four core requirements
grounded in its statutory text. To qualify as a "covered class action"
preserved under the carve-out, an action must (1) be based upon the
law of the state in which the issuer is incorporated, and (2) involve
either (3) the purchase or sale of securities between the issuer (or an
affiliate) and its shareholders or (4) a communication regarding the
sale of the issuer's securities that is made by or on behalf of the issuer
(or an affiliate) to shareholders and concerns core shareholder
decisions (e.g., voting; selling; dissenting).1 This note analyzes each
requirement individually below.

2009). In such instances, case law remains unclear on whether the court must remand the entire
action or just those claims it finds to be preserved by the carve-out. See infra Part III.E.
112. Madden, 576 F.3d 957.
113. Atkinson, 658 F.3d 549.
114. Dabit,547 U.S. at 87-88.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(B) (1998).
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A. TuE CARVE-OUT'S "STAT LAW" REQUIREMENT
1. The relevant "'issuer"
The carve-out covers claims based on the state law of "the
issuer." Generally, determining which entity is the relevant issuer is a
simple task since the securities being litigated are typically issued by
the named defendant.
However, the determination can be
troublesome in extraordinary circumstances, especially in cases
involving multiple defendants.
For example, in Madden, shareholders of St. Joseph Medical
Corporation ("St. Joseph") and Orange Coast Managed Care
Services ("Orange Coast") brought a state law class action against an
investment bank for alleged misrepresentation made in connection
with the sale of both corporations to FPA Medical Management
("FPA"). 6 On motion to remand, the defendant argued that neither
St. Joseph nor Orange Coast was the "issuer" for purposes of the
carve-out because neither issued FPA's securities, which the court
deemed "covered securities" under SLUSA's preclusion provision.
The defendant reasoned that the carve-out's mention of "the issuer,"
rather than "an issuer," suggested that the carve-out117was limited to
claims involving the issuer of the "covered securities.5
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, relying primarily on plain language
considerations. "[T]he plain language of [the carve-out] allows a
shareholder to bring a covered class action under state law against
any 'issuer' that has made certain communications regarding the sale
of its 'securities,' and that these securities need not be the 'covered
securit[ies]' referred to in [the preclusion clause]1 1 8 (emphasis
added). The court added that the "public debate" surrounding
inclusion of the carve-out as an exception to SLUSA preclusion
suggests that it was designed to preserve state law actions brought "in
connection with extraordinary corporate transactions requiring

116. ladden, 576 F.3d at 961-62.
117. Id.
118. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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shareholder approval, such as mergers and tender offers," regardless
of whether or not the corporation issued "covered securities."11 9
At least one court has also suggested that there need not be only
one relevant issuer. In In re Metlife Demutualization Litigation,
plaintiffs against MetLife Co. in federal court sought to enjoin a
similar class action in state court, arguing that the latter action was
not covered by the carve-out because it alleged fraud by MetLife,
Inc., an entirely distinct "issuer" incorporated in a different state than
what was required for the carve-out.' 20 The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York found otherwise, holding that the class
action in state court sufficiently alleged fraud by MetLife Co. 2'
Regardless, the court added, even if the action made claims against
both MetLife Co. and MetLife, Inc., "the Delaware Carve Out does
not indicate that there must be only one set of relevant shares....
[and] could apply to both MetLife Co. and MetLife, Inc. shares."' '
2. "Basedupon the statutory or common law" of the issuer's state of
incorporation
Once the court ascertains "the issuer" for purposes of the carveout, plaintiffs must then establish that their claim is "based upon the
statutory or common law of the State in which the issuer is
incorporated (in the case of a corporation) or organized (in the case
of any other entity)." Courts have consistently held that, while the
action must assert a claim based on the law of the issuer's state of
14
incorporation, 3 plaintiffs need not file that action within that state.

119. Id.at 971.
120. In re Metlife Demutualization Litig., CV 00-2258(TCP)(AKT), 2006 WL 2524196, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,2006).
121. Id.
122. Metlife, supra note 120, at 6.
123. See e.., Mladden, 576 F.3d at 972 (holding that carve-out did not preserve claims in
which relevant issuer that was incorporated in Delaware because claims were based on
California law); In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 441, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (holding that carve-out did not preserve plaintiffs' claims because issuer was incorporated
in Bermuda); Greaves v. McAuley, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding that,
because claims were based on Georgia law, carve-out preserved claims in which relevant issuer
was a Georgia corporation but did not preserve claims in which issuer was a Maryland
corporation).
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However, if an action is filed outside the state of the issuer's
incorporation, plaintiffs will likely bear the burden of invoking the
law of that state. 125 Merely showing that the law of the state in which
the claim is filed in provides a similar cause of action to the state
law
26
burden.1
this
satisfy
not
will
incorporation
of
of the issuer's state
Defendants have argued that the carve-out's legislative history
suggests that the carve-out should apply only to suits filed within the
relevant issuer's state of incorporation." However, most courts have
insisted that the lack of ambiguity within the carve-out's relevant
text-namely, that an action must be "based upon" the law of the
state of incorporation -counsels against an implicit venue limitation.
As the District Court for the Southern District of California stated in
Gibson v. PS Group Holdings, Inc., "nothing in this language [is]
susceptible to clarification or interpretation by either the House
Conference or Senate Banking Committee Reports. Had Congress
intended to impose a restriction on the venue of actions preserved by

124. See, e.g., Huang v. Reyes, No. C 07-5950 CRB, 2008 WL 648519, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 2008) (preserving action filed in California state court based on Delaware law); Indiana
Flee. Workers Pension Trust Fund v. Millard, 07 CIV. 172 JGK, 2007 WL 2141697, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (preserving action filed in New York state court but based on
Delaware law); Rubery v. Radian Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 07-1068, 2007 WL 1575211, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 31, 2007) (preserving action filed in Philadelphia small claims court but based on Delaware
law); Lewis v. Termeer, 445 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (preserving action filed in New
York state court but based on Massachusetts law); Decristofaro v. May Dep't Stores Co., No.
4:05CV526-DJS, 2005 WL 1528260, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2005) (preserving action filed in St.
Louis City court but based on Delaware law); Gibson v. PS Grp. Holdings, Inc., No. 00-CV-0372
W(RBV), 2000 WL 777818, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2000) (preserving action filed in California
state court but based on Delaware law); Lalondriz v. USA Networks, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 352,
354, adhered to on reconsideration, 68 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (preserving action filed
in New York state court but based on Delaware law). In Atkinson, the Sixth Circuit held that
the carve-out did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims but did so without opining on the fact that
the claims were filed in Minnesota state court but based on the state law of Tennessee, where
the defendant was incorporated.
125. Aadden, 576 F.3d at 972 ("A plaintiff suing [a company incorporated outside of
California] in a California court bears the burden of invok[ing] the law of a jurisdiction other
than California[.]').
126. Mladden, supra note 125.
127. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998)([T]he Committee expressly does not intend for
suits excepted under this provision to be brought in venues other than in the issuer's state of
incorporation .... "); H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at n.2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (-It is the intention of
the managers that the suits under this exception be limited to the state in which issuer of the
security is incorporated .... ").
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the Delaware carve-out, it could have done so in the language of the
statute. This it did not do."'28
B. THE CARVE-OUT'S "INVOLVES" REQUIREMENT
A claim must "involve" one of carve-out's two central prongs
(see Sections C and D below) to qualify for preservation. The reach
of the carve-out pivots on how a court defines "involves": A broad
interpretation of "involve" would preserve more state-law actions,
while a more rigid interpretation would have the opposite effect.
Until recently, most lower courts were willing to rely on the
carve-out's legislative history to construe "involves" broadly. 29 In
Lewis v. Termeer, for instance, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York preserved a class action alleging fraud after
shareholders sold their shares as a part of defendants' stock exchange
program. 30 The defendant asserted that, because some plaintiffs
tendered their shares on the public market, the claim did not consist
of an "exclusive" transaction between the issuer and shareholders and
therefore disqualified the entire action from preservation under the
carve-out's first prong.1 3 The court disagreed, instead focusing its
analysis on the carve-out's requirement that the action merely
"involve" an exclusive transaction. 32 Under a broad reading of
"involves," the action was still preserved even if not all relevant
transactions were literally made "exclusively" between the issuer and
shareholders. 133
The court reasoned that its construction of
"involves" was supported by a Congressional report describing
134
deference to relief under state law.
128. Gibson, 2000 WL 777818, at *6.
129. See, e.g. Millard,2007 WL 2141697, at *5 (noting that lower courts have construed the
carve-out consistently with its broad language); In re Aletlife DemutualizationLiti ., 2006 WL
2524196, at *6 (finding that the "definition of involve' is quite broad, indicating that a number
of securities may be purchased or sold").
130. Termeer, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
131. Id. Termeer arguably could have been decided differently had the court focused its
analysis on the term "exclusively" rather than the term "involves," especially considering other
precedent defining on the former.
132. Id
133. Id.at 373.
134. Id.at 372-73 (citing S. PEP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998)).
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In Atkinson, however, the Sixth Circuit took an entirely separate
understanding of Congressional intent when it dismissed a class
action filed by mutual fund shareholders alleging state-law fraud
against the funds' issuer after their shares dropped in value. 13 The
court first held that the plaintiffs were merely "holders" of a security
and thus did not satisfy the carve-out's first prong, which requires "a
purchase or sale of securities." 136 As in Termeer, the plaintiffs
contended that, even if they held their securities during the alleged
fraud, the claim still involved the purchase or sale of securities under37
1
the broader reading of "involves" suggested by legislative history.
However, unlike Termeer, the Sixth Circuit dismissed this theory as
the "faulty senate-report argument." 138
The A tkinson court framed its analysis of the carve-out with the
"more important SLUSA story," one in which Congress enacted
SLUSA to ensure that certain class actions were governed by uniform
standards or precluded altogether.1 39 Under this microscope, the
court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to analogize the term "involves" to
the phrase "in connection with," which had been construed broadly
1 4°
by the Supreme Court in Dabit.
"The difference between these
terms is quite significant, because 'in connection with' is a statutorily
14
significant term of art," even prior to Dabit.
'
The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that Congress was likely aware of this broad construction
when it included "in connection with" within SLUSA's preemption
provision but excluded it from the carve-out, implying that Congress
intended for a more limited scope for the latter. 142
C. TuE CARVE-OUT'S FIRST PRONG
A class action must "involve" conduct categorized in at least one
of the carve-out's two subsections to qualify for preservation. The
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 557.
Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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first subsection -sometimes referred to as "the first Delaware carveout" -exempts actions that involve (1) "the purchase or sale of
securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer" that are (2)
"exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the issuer. ,143
This prong effectively preserves shareholder claims alleging fraud
144
with respect to buy-back transactions.
1. "Purchaseorsale of securitiesby the issuer"
To qualify for preservation under this prong, plaintiffs must first
establish that a "purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an
affiliate"' 4 was made. The "purchase or sale" requirement is
troublesome for holder claims, i.e., claims in which plaintiffs are
shareholders but neither sold nor purchased securities during the
alleged misconduct.
This was the case in Atkinson, in which
shareholders of various mutual funds alleged that they would have
sold their shares if not for material omissions in the funds'
disclosures. 146 The Sixth Circuit again relied on plain language
considerations in distinguishing "purchasing or selling" 4securities
1 7
from merely "holding" securities, as the plaintiffs had done.
Although the plaintiffs argued that the funds' obligation to
redeem their shares amounted to a "contract to purchase," the Sixth
Circuit found that an already-acquired "contract to purchase" still
was not an "infinitely extending 'purchase' under the carve-out." 148
At best, plaintiffs' theory "transform[ed] Plaintiffs not from holders
into purchasers, but .. .into different types of holders-holders of

143. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i) (2014).
144. O'Hare, supra note 16, at 503.
145. SLUSA defines "affiliate" as "a person that directly or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries, controls or is controlled by or is under common control with, the issuer." 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(5)(A) (2014). See e.g.,
In re letlife DemutuallationLitiz.,2006 WL 2524196, at
*6 (finding that a wholly owned subsidiary is an "affiliate" of the relevant issuer for purposes of
the carve-out).
146. Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 553.
147. Id. See also Crimi v. Barnholt, C 08-02249 CRB, 2008 WL 4287566, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2008) (plaintiffs' claims that arise merely from their decision to "hold" the issuer's
stock was not preserved under the carve-out).
148. Id.
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2. "Exclusivelyfrom or to "equity holders
Even if a court finds that a purchase or sale of securities was
made, plaintiffs must still persuade the court that the purchase or sale
was made "exclusively" from the issuer to equity holders. The
inclusion of the term "exclusively" in this portion of the carve-out
generally disqualifies any action involving any public transaction,
such as a public offering. Accordingly, courts have generally adopted
a literal, more rigid interpretation of the term "exclusively,"
precluding any action in which transaction at issue was made in the
open market.5 0 As the District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana held in G.E Thomas Investments, LY v. Gleco Corp.,
"only when shares of stock are purchased or sold to a limited market
(that of the corporation's current shareholders) will the [first]
Delaware carve-out provision apply. When the stock is offered to the
open market, SLUSA governs the prospective class action." '
In
Gleco, plaintiffs argued that "exclusively" was not transaction-specific
and instead applied to the relevant parties in the dispute.5 2 Under
this theory, the requirement would have been satisfied because the
1 3
class was comprised "exclusively" of the defendant's shareholders.

149. Id.
150. See, e.-.,
G.F. Thomas Investments, L.P. v. Cleco Corp., 317 F. Supp. 2d 673, 685 (W.D.
La. 2004), aff'd sub nom. GF Thomas Investments LP v. Cleco Corp., 123 F. App'x 155 (5th Cir.
20 05) (plaintiffs' allegations of defendant's false and misleading official statements and SEC
filings did not involve an offer "exclusive" to existing shareholders); Zoren v. Genesis Energy,
L.P., 195 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604 (D. Del. 2002) (plaintiffs' claim that defendants made material
misrepresentations and omissions regarding two public offerings because the offerings involved
a purchase or sale to prospective shareholders, not "exclusively from or to" existing
shareholders); Burekovitch v. Hertz, 01-CV-1277 (ILG),2001 WL 984942, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.July
24, 2001) (plaintiffs' claim against president who pledged 40 of the company's shares as
collateral did not involve a purchase or sale "exclusive" to existing shareholders). But see
Termeer, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (action was preserved under the carve-out even though some
class members tendered their shares on the open market); In re Mletlife, 2006 WL 2524196, at *6
(action fell within the carve-out even though some of the shares of relevant issuer were issued to
the public).
151. Cleco, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The court dismissed this novel interpretation in favor of dictionary
definitions of the term "exclusive" -a common theme in carve-out
jurisprudence.5 4

D. THE CARVE OUT'S SECOND PRONG
A claim may also involve conduct described in the carve-out's
second subsection-also known as "the second Delaware carveout"-to qualify for preservation. The second subsection preserves
claims involving (1) "any recommendation, position, or other
communication with respect to the sale of securities of the issuer" that
is (2) "made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer"
to equity holders," and (3) concerns equity holders' decisions "with
respect to voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or
exchange offer, or exercising dissenters' or appraisal rights." 155
The carve-out's second prong contains more ambiguous terms
and phrases than the first prong. Although narrowly designed to
preserve shareholder claims alleging fraud in connection with an
issuer's tender offer, exchange offer, or merger, the second prong
contains open-ended terms like "communication," "on behalf of,"
and "with respect to. 1 IS6 Unsurprisingly, different courts have
construed these terms both in favor of and against plaintiffs arguing
for preservation.
1. "'Anyrecommendation,position, or other communication with
respect to the sale"7 of securities of the issuer"
Courts have interpreted "any recommendation, position, or
other communication" to include a broad variety of statements made
by issuers. Most frequently, these "communications" are company

154. Id. at 681-85.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii) (2014).
156. O'Hare, supra note 16, at 503.
157. The definition of a "sale" of securities for purposes of the carve-out has not been
litigated. However, for the Supreme Court's definition of a "sale" of securities in other
contexts, see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 469 (1969).
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proxy statements.15 8 However, courts have also previously found
press releases,159 information booklets,1 60 financial statements,1 61 and
"fairness opinions"162 to satisfy this requirement, regardless of
whether or not the communication was addressed to the plaintiffs
specifically.
In Rubery v. Radian Group, Inc., for instance, shareholders of a
financial services company alleged that corporate directors and
officers breached their fiduciary duties by improperly agreeing to a
merger under Delaware law. 163 On motion to remand, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the
company's press release announcing the merger to the public was a
"communication" within the meaning of the carve-out, even if the
announcement was released publicly.1 64 The court appeared to focus
its analysis on the issuer's intent in the communication. As the court
explained, "[a]lthough Defendants issued the press release to the
general public, [and not to shareholders in particular,] they plainly
wrote it to encourage Radian's shareholders to approve the proposed
merger."165

158. Actions alleging fraudulent proxy statements that are preserved by the carve-out
typically involve proxy statements that recommend shareholder votes on either backdated stock
options or company mergers. See, e.., Walker v. Bolt Tech. Corp., No. 3:14-CV-01406 MPS,
2014 WL 7404762, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2014); Weitman v. Tutor, 588 F. Supp. 2d 133, 139 (D.
Mass. 2008); Huang, 2008 WL 648519, at *6; Crimi, 2008 WL 4287566, at *3; Pace v. Bidzos,
Nos. C 07-3742 PJH, C 07-3332 PJH, 2007 WL 2908283, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Oct.3, 2007); Alillard,
2007 WL 2141697 at *4; City of Ann Arbor Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Gecht, No. C-06-7453 EMC,
2007 WL 760568 at *6 (N.D.Cal. Mar.9, 2007); Superior Partners v. Chang, 471 F. Supp. 2d 750,
754 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Gibson, 2000 WL 777818 at *5; Derdiger v. Tallman, 75 F. Supp. 2d 322,
325 (D. Del. 1999). But cf Fisher v. Kansas, 487 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280-81 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd
288 F. App'x 721 (2d Cir. 2008) (carve-out does not cover misrepresentations within proxy
statements regarding executive compensation).
159. See, e.-., Ruber, 2007 WL 1575211, at *5-6; Alessi v. Beracha, 244 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359
(D. Del. 2003); Greaves, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
160. In reAletlife, 2006 WL 2524196, at *6.
161. Lazar v. Gregerson, No. C 02-0652 SI, 2002 WL 535405, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 20(P).
162. Aladden, 576 F.3d at 972.
163. Ruber; 2007 WL 1575211, at *L
164. Ruber; 2007 WL 1575211, at *5-.
165. Id. Contra Drulias v. Ade Corp., CIV.A. 06-11033 PBS, 2006 WL 17665(P (D. Mass.
June 26, 2006) (holding that alleged misrepresentation in preliminary proxy statement was not a
"communication" within the carve-out because it was not communicated to shareholders, but
filed with the SEC as required by statute). However, numerous courts have found Druliasto be
wrongly decided. See City Trading Fund v. Nye, 46 Misc. 3d 1206(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015);
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2. "Madeby or behalfof the issueroran affiliate of the issuer" to
equity holders
In actions against an issuer, proving that the allegedly fraudulent
communication was indeed made by the issuer directly is typically an
uncomplicated task.
Courts have consistently found that
communications by directors, officers, and other high-level
management are at least made "on behalf of" the issuer for purposes
of the carve-out. 166 However, against a non-issuer party, plaintiffs
naturally have a higher burden in establishing that the defendant
made the communication "on behalf of" the issuer or that the party is
otherwise "an affiliate" 167 of the issuer.

Madden provided the clearest guidance on these terms while
adopting a broad interpretation of "on behalf of." More specifically,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that this portion of the carve-out "refers
to an individual or entity that makes a communication to an issuer's
stockholders in the interest of, as a representative of, or for the
benefit of the issuer. 1 68 As explained above, shareholders of St.
Joseph and Orange Coast alleged that an investment bank misled
shareholders in a "fairness opinion" that recommended the sale of
both corporations to FPA.1 69 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
plaintiffs' argument that the bank's fairness opinion was sufficiently

Chang, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55.
166. See, e.., Nickell v. Shanahan, ED99163, 2013 WL 2402852, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. June 4,
2013) (registration statement signed by the relevant issuer's CEO recommending shareholders
to approve a merger was sufficiently "on behalf of" the issuer); Alillard,2007 WL 2141697, at *9
(claims against the issuer as well as directors and officers of the issuer preserved under the
carve-out); Chan, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 759 (claims against the issuer as well as directors and
officers of the issuer preserved under the carve-out).
167. SLUSA defines "affiliate" as "a person that directly or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries, controls or is controlled by or is under common control with, the issuer." 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(5)(A) (2014). See, e.-., In re Aletlife, 2006 WL 2524196, at *6 (finding that a
wholly owned subsidiary is an "affiliate" of the relevant issuer for purposes of the carve-out's
first subsection).
168. Aladden, 576 F.3d at 973. See, e.-., Nickell, 2013 WL 2402852, at *6 (relying on
Aladden's construction of "on behalf of").
169. Aladden, 576 F.3d at 961-62.
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"on behalf of" St. Joseph and Orange Coast, eschewing a literal
interpretation that would limit "on behalf of" to insiders employed by
the issuer.170 Management from both issuers had formed a Special
Committee that retained the bank "for the purpose of determining
whether the transaction was fair" and that ultimately approved the
merger in reliance of the bank's recommendation."' Because the
bank's fairness opinion was made at least "in the interest of" the
issuer, it satisfied the "on behalf of" requirement for purposes of the
carve-out.1 73. "Concernsdecisions of those equity holders with respect to voting
their securities,actingin response to a tender or exchange offer, or
exercising dissenters or appraisalrghts'
Plaintiffs arguing for preservation under the second prong must
also show that the relevant "communication" concerned decisions
made by equity holders "with respect to" voting, acting in response to
an offer, or exercising their dissenters' or appraisal rights. 73 The
second prong's reach thus hinges on how a court defines "with respect
to," similarly to how the carve-out as a whole hinges on the
"involves" requirement discussed in Section B. Unlike the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of "involves" in Atkinson, however, courts
have appeared more willing to construe "with respect to" broadly to
preserve more actions under the carve-out. 74
In City of Ann Arbor Employees' Retirement System v. Gecht,
for example, the District Court for the Northern District of California
equated "with respect to" to "in connection with," interpreted

170. Id. at 972-73.
171. Id. at 973.
172. Id.
173. Actions alleging communications that concern equity holder decisions with respect to
voting securities or acting in response to a tender or exchange offer typically involve
shareholder approval of either backdates stock options or company mergers. See cases cited
supra notes 104-08.
174. See, e.-., Gecht, 2007 WL 760568, at *4-7 (proxy statements seeking shareholder
approval of backdating stock options sufficiently concerned decisions "with respect to" voting of
securities); Millard,2007 WL 2141697, at *6-7 (reaching the same holding as Gechtfor purposes
of the carve-out).
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liberally by the Supreme Court in Dabitand by other circuit courts
prior to the Dabit decision.175 In Gecht, the court considered the
plaintiffs' allegations against the issuer for fraudulent proxy
statements seeking shareholder authorization of backdated stock
options. 116 In finding that the action fell under the carve-out's scope,
the court ultimately adopted the Ninth Circuit's construction of "in
connection with" in Falkowski v. Imation Corp., which ruled that a
statement is "inconnection with" a securities transaction if it is at
least "more than tangentially related" to the transaction. 7 7 Plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged "more than a 'tangential' relationship between
Defendants' allegedly fraudulent communications to shareholders
and the prospective sale of securities at issue (i.e., stock option
grants)" to qualify for preservation.7 8
E.

REMAND

OF AN ACTION PRESERVED

BY THE DELAWARE

CARVE-OUT

A federal court must remand a class action's claim back to state
court once the judge finds that it qualifies for preservation under the
carve-out." 9 However, courts have disagreed on whether the carveout requires actions that are partiallypreserved by the carve-outi.e., only some of the plaintiffs' claims qualify for carve-out
preservation-be remanded in their entirety. The District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia decided that actions with some
preserved claims be remanded in their entirety, reasoning that
SLUSA's statutory language suggests that federal courts are required
to remand the entire case to state court.1 8° More specifically, under
l75. Gecht,2007 WL 760568, at *4-7.
176. Id. at* 1.
177. Id. at *4-7 (citing Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2002)).
178. Id. at *7.
179. Greaves, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 ("The Delaware carve-out preserves, and requires this
court to remand, certain 'covered class action[s]."').
180. Greaves, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. See also Chang,471 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55 (concluding
that a court must either dismiss or remand the entire action). Other SLUSA-related cases have
suggested that plaintiffs' claims are severable, and that only SLUSA only requires dismissal of
proper claims. However, none of these cases specifically adjudicated on the scope of remand
under the carve-out. See, e.-.,
White v. Lord Abbett & Co. (In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee
Litig.), 553 F.3d 248, 256 (3d. Cir.2009); Falkoirski309 F.3d at 1128-32.
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SLUSA's sequencing of analysis in its text, the court was required to
first determine if removal of the action was appropriate pursuant to
SLUSA's removal provision and then determine if any statutory
exception preserved jurisdiction in state court. 181 If an exception did
apply, SLUSA stipulated, "the Federal court shall remand such action
to such State court.""18
After deciding that "all doubts about
jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court," the
court ordered to remand all claims even if it found that only some of
the plaintiffs' claims were preserved by the carve-out and other claims
were otherwise dismissible under SLUSA preclusion.1 83
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CARVE-OUT
This survey of case law above highlights an overarching question
courts regularly face when deciding the carve-out's applicability:
exactly how far into state law did Congress intend to go'? This tension
manifests itself in how courts approach the carve-out's broad
statutory language.
Courts more willing to dismiss an action
frequently adopt the approach adopted in Atkinson, in which the
Sixth Circuit interpreted the carve-out within the "more important
SLUSA story," i.e., Congress's prophylactic preclusion of certain
state law class actions. On the other hand, courts more willing to
preserve an action under the carve-out are likely to adopt the
deferential approach displayed in Madden and Termeer. Both cases
emphasized Congress's express reticence to intruding on state law
causes of action.
Below, this article argues that courts should adopt the more
deferential approach espoused in cases like Madden and Termeer.
Particularly in light of post-SLUSA developments in Delaware and
federal law, the risks associated with carve-out's preclusive effect
have become more alarming, while the justifications for SLUSA
preclusion are not as pronounced.

181. Greaves, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1084-85.
182. Id. at 1085.
183. Id. at 1086.
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A. MALONE V. BRINCA T
The belief that Congress avoided sensitive federalism issues by
adopting the carve-out into SLUSA was short-lived. The carve-out
was modeled on decades of relatively well-settled Delaware law on
the fiduciary duty of disclosure, which generally only applied when a
director or officer requested shareholder action. However, less than a
month after SLUSA was enacted, the Delaware Supreme Court
disrupted its own rule when it decided Malone v. Brincat.l84 The
Malone court abandoned the shareholder action limitation, widely
expanding the duty of disclosure so that it was no longer coextensive
with the carve-out.
The Malone opinion itself can inform critiques of the carve-out.
In Malone, shareholders of a publicly traded company alleged that
directors violated their fiduciary duty of disclosure by making false
SEC filings and distributing false financial statements to
shareholders.1 8 The Chancery Court dismissed these claims because
directors had not requested any shareholder action.1 86 In a surprising
departure from established precedent, the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed the Chancery Court's dismissal. Regardless of whether a
shareholder action is requested, the Court held, "directors who
knowingly disseminate false information that results in corporate
injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate their fiduciary
1 87
duty."5
Importantly, the Supreme Court in Malone recognized the
potential overlap of the decision with federal securities law,
acknowledging its historical deference to "the panoply of federal
protections that are available to investors in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."" The Malone shareholders, however,
had neither purchased nor sold their sales, rendering those federal
protections unavailable. As such, the Court declined to defer to
federal regulation and ruled that "[w]hen directors communicate
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Mfalone, 722 A.2d 5.
Id. at 8.
Malone v. Brincat, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 15510, 1997 WL 697940, at *2 (Oct. 30, 1997).
Id. at *9.
Malone, supra note 186, at *13.
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publicly or directly with shareholders about corporate matters the
sine qua non of directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders is
honesty.""
1.

Revisititg the Carve-OutafterMalone

The carve-out's language thus became outdated the minute
Malone was handed down. After Malone, fiduciary duty of disclosure
claims that do not involve a request for shareholder action are
cognizable under Delaware law. However, such claims are still at risk
of SLUSA preclusion since the carve-out's text assumes a shareholder
action requirement, as was the case for decades prior to Malone. The
carve-out thus falls short of its intended coverage, leaving actions that
do not involve a request for shareholder action vulnerable to SLUSA
preclusion, even if there is a clear case of breach of fiduciary duty.
As such, some have convincingly argued that Congress should
amend the carve-out to correctly align with Delaware's post-Malone
fiduciary duty of disclosure.1 90 While a Congressional amendment to
the carve-out would be a decisive fix, even the most optimistic critics
must admit that compelling Congress to agree to such a meticulous
fine-tuning of a savings clause like the carve-out is wishful thinking.
Instead, as the survey of carve-out-related case law above
suggests, federal courts may serve as the more effective forum for
updating the carve-out.
Courts need not transform their
understanding of the carve-out wholesale, but can instead rely on
traditional principles of legislative intent. As detailed in Section D,
the record supporting the carve-out strongly indicates a
Congressional intent to preserve state regulation of the fiduciary duty
of disclosure. The carve-out was designed to cover claims actionable
under the Delaware fiduciary duty of disclosure. Malone simply
represents the governing standard for the fiduciary duty of disclosure
under state law updated after SLUSA was enacted.
189. Id. at *10. The Court remanded and permitted plaintiffs to replead. Id at *15.
Notably, however, if an identical action was pleaded with the same facts after Dabit,it would
likely be removed to federal court and dismissed under SLUSA. Dabitruled that such "holder"
claims are not outside SLUSA's preemptive scope. Dabit,547 U.S. at 78.
190. See O'Hare, supra note 16, at 508.
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Therefore, in deference to Congressional intent, courts
interpreting the carve-out should be more willing to preserve state
law claims cognizable under Malone. For instance, a court deciding a
close question of the carve-out's applicability to a certain action can
broadly define the "involves" requirement-as the Termeer court
did-or adopt an expansive approach of the two shareholder action
prongs as the Madden court did.
B. CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP v. TROICE AND TILE DECLINE OF
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION FILINGS

Since SLUSA's enactment, the U.S. Supreme Court has
elaborated SLUSA's preclusive provision twice. As discussed above,
in Dabit, the Supreme Court adopted an expansive reading of
SLUSA's preclusion provision, giving significant weight to SLUSA's
express mandate to preclude state law class actions from frustrating
the PSLRA's objectives. Under this approach, SLUSA even barred
actions not traditionally regulated by securities law (i.e., holder
claims). Since Dabit, litigators and scholars have contemplated
exactly how far SLUSA reached into state law under such a broad
interpretation.
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has been more
willing to impose limits on SLUSA's preclusive reach.
In
Chadbourne& Parke LLP v. Troice, the Court found that a state law
class action against companies that allegedly engaged in the infamous
Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme was not precluded by SLUSA because
the alleged fraud was not made "in connection with" a transaction of
"covered security," as required under SLUSA's preclusion
provision. 9 ' Investors bringing the action were allegedly induced by
defendants to purchase a bank's certificates of deposit, which are not
the type of nationally traded securities that qualify as a "covered
security." The Court rejected the defendants' argument that the
alleged fraud was made at least "in connection with" transactions of
covered securities since the certificates of deposit were backed by the
bank's holdings of covered securities.
191. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. I058, 1066 (2014).
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Troice is relevant to an interpretation of the carve-out because it
sets forth the Supreme Court's newfound disinclination to allow more
state-law class actions in spite of SLUSA preclusion. Troice was not
decided in a vacuum. As Justice Breyer himself, writing for the
majority, recognizes, the Court has historically interpreted "in
connection with" broadly and flexibly, as was the case in Dabit. By
reading "in connection with" narrowly and deviating from wellsettled precedent (the focal point of Justice Kennedy's dissent),
Troice should signal to lower courts that the era of broad SLUSA
preclusion is dwindling. Decisions like the Sixth Circuit's conclusion
that preservation under the carve-out is outweighed by the
supposedly "more important SLUSA story" of state law preemption
holds less weight in the wake of Troice. On the other hand, a broad
reading of the carve-out's language adheres to Troice's new approach
to SLUSA.
SLUSA preclusion is also less justifiable in light of stark drop in
federal securities fraud class action filings in recent years. Such filings
reached a sixteen-year record low of 152 filings in 2012.1, In 2014,
there were no filings with alleged investor losses of greater than five
billion dollars for the first time since 1997 and settlement dollars for
securities actions hit their lowest point since 1998.1" These statistics
hardly warrant the same concerns of "vexatious litigation" and
baseless lawsuits that necessitated the enactment of the PSLRA and
SLUSA in the mid 1990s. With these issues largely removed, federal
courts should be less convinced to preclude state law remedies under
SLUSA.
V. CONCLUSION

192. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, Securities Class Action Filings: 2012 Year in Review
(2013), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/81eldaa9-7a2e-4589-9dd6a443950b0837/Securities-Class-Action-Filings -2012-Year-in-Revie.pdf.
193. CORNERSTONE

RESEARCH,

SECURITIES

CLASS

ACTION FILINGS:

2014

YEAR

IN

REVIEW (2015), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2015-0127cornerstone.pdf; Press Release, Cornerstone Research, Total Settlement Dollars for Securities
Class Actions Hit 16-Year Low According to New Cornerstone Research Report (Mar. 24,
2015), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/total-settlement-dollars-for-securitiesclass-actions-hit-16-year-low-according-to-new-cornerstone-research-report-2015-03-24.
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As this article illustrates, courts interpreting the Delaware carveout are forced to weigh two distinct goals made explicit by Congress
when it enacted SLUSA. First, in an effort to prevent plaintiffs from
avoiding the PSLRA's stringent requirements, Congress sought to
preempt certain securities-related state law class actions altogether.
Second, in deference to state regulation of director and officer
fiduciary duties, Congress also carved out state law claims based upon
the fiduciary duty of disclosure from SLUSA preemption.
The broad statutory language that comprises both SLUSA's
preclusion provision and the carve-out effectively gives a court
discretion in deciding which of these Congressional objectives will
color its analysis when deciding the carve-out's scope. This article
contends that, in light of legal and empirical developments since
SLUSA's enactment, courts should be wary of precluding state law
actions that could conceivably be preserved under the carve-out.
Courts should consistently construe the carve-out as a symbol of
Congressional deference to state regulation of corporate law. Failure
to do so puts the carve-out at risk of being a defunct limitation on
federal encroachment onto state territory.

